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 Abstract
We are experiencing a digital revolution that is changing the very nature of law. Digital code 
becomes a form of regulation through which private actors link their values to technological 
artifacts that prove capable of conditioning their operations both on a material and moral 
level. But technological artifacts appear to be non-neutral means, reflecting choices of dif-
ferent nature, among which those of a political nature stand out. The more the regulatory 
provisions are implemented through the use of technologies, the more the codes acquire the 
status of a regulatory technique, which can be used both to define and incorporate regulatory 
and contractual provisions into codes both to implement them. The impact of the algorithm is 
of crystal clear relevance not only in regulation but also in the other side of the coin: surveil-
lance. Each new option brought by the development of technology brings new possibilities 
and changes the way humans relate to each other. All these beautiful technological devices 
that few of us are willing to abandon produce a positive enhancement of the human and new 
kind of addiction, but also a new slavery”. The algorithmic revolution spills over to society and 
public systems designed to ensure its well-being. So, fiscal consequences of the algorithmic 
revolution risk, if not governed, to call into question the very foundation of the social pact, to 
which the fiscal duty is connected as a manifestation of solidarity within an organized com-
munity, not only within the borders of the individual State but also in a wider sphere. Legal 
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scholars can face the newest challenges of the present without fear and without nostalgia. 
But to this purpose he must remove all obstacles to the necessary dialogue between jurists of 
different backgrounds, between jurists and non-jurists, between jurists and society. 
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1. What is law? Three layers of the legal dimension
Law is a technology. Law is techne. It is the technology of social coexistence. To 
achieve this result, it uses very powerful technological machinery: the legal system, 
made up mainly — or exclusively for some [Kelsen H., 1967] — of norms.
The legal norm is a technical rule. If you want to work within the system, you 
must know how it works: you must acquire highly specialized technical knowl-
edge. Law is the knowledge of doing or making things with norms [Austin  J., 
1962]. Surely, jurists change the legal world with normative propositions: we cre-
ate institutions, modify personal status, and operate on society with these kinds 
of tools. 
However, is law just this? Is it just norms? Is it just technology? Is it just a set of 
rules concerning a social body? Of course, not. Law is not merely the set of regula-
tory provisions that govern social organizations. Otherwise, we could talk about 
something like Neanderthal law and maybe even penguin law or ant law”, and so 
on. We have to go beyond that.
Law has not always existed: it is a human creation, and it is not the first creation 
conceived by homo sapiens. Law is a specific kind of knowledge that was born in 
Ancient Rome a few centuries before Christ [Schiavone A., 2005]. Today, we still 
study Roman law not only because it allows us to learn two or three Latin phrases 
to impress our clients but also because the history of our research field was born 
there, in Rome: it was in Rome that a class of scholars started to dedicate them-
selves for the first time to jus, an autonomous area of knowledge, detached from 
religion, ethics and politics. It was in Ancient Rome that law became a science”, 
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where the term science stands not for natural science or hard science or empirical 
science but for scientia, which in Latin means knowledge per se (just as episteme 
in Ancient Greek).
Thus, law is both technology and science. However, that is still not enough. Law 
is also a form of art”. Why is Michelangelo’s David so famous? Surely, because it 
is beautiful. However, more than that, it is the symbol of a young man with just a 
stone in his hand fighting against tremendous forces. And the young man — clear-
ly a symbolic representation of Renaissance Florence — wins. It is the symbolic 
dimension of the work that really makes it stand out. 
Law requires technical ability — techne — and overall vision — episteme. It uses 
tools and means to achieve high ends. It is rational, yet it cannot be purely rational 
because of the symbolic dimension at its foundation. It is ritual, yet it must also be 
myth [Stolfi E., 2020]. And law is also art”, because it is artificial”: it is a creation of 
the human intellect. It is not natural, i.e., there is no law without humans. 
2. Law and ICTs. From sacred orality  
to blind computability
Law — technology, science and art together — provides mankind with a means 
of coexistence. In this perspective, there must be communication between hu-
mans. This is why law and communication technologies have always been bound 
together. For this reason, it would be useful to reinterpret the history of law in the 
light of the four great revolutions of information and communication technolo-
gies in an inevitably concise overview.
Let us start with language or, better, words. Law consists of words, and it is 
words that must be communicated. Law is jus dicere: jurisdiction. The very con-
cept of normativity rests on this vision directed at other human beings and at the 
future. Nevertheless, in comparison to other forms of language, legal language 
has something magic about it. This is why primitive law was managed by priests: 
priests jealous of their own wisdom, which was exclusively oral wisdom. 
As a reaction against such elitist knowledge, people demanded to know what 
rules were used to resolve legal disputes. They wanted to understand how these 
clerics made their decisions. It was a matter of power, of course. So, it happened 
that oral law was put for the first time in writing, as evidenced by the Law of the 
Twelve Tables or the Jus Flavianum [Zocco-Rosa  A., 1914]. After law became 
written law, anyone who was capable of reading could access this knowledge, con-
trol it, and try to change it. The new law was without doubt more democratic than 
primitive law. It represented a revolution in law, related to the new use of the 
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technological instrument of writing: jus was separated from fas, the most sacred 
sphere. This marked the birth of law as a science studied by legal scholars.
This law naturally paid very close attention not only to words but also to the oral 
dimension. Nevertheless, for over a thousand years, the Roman paradigm continued 
to exert a fundamental influence in the West, precisely because it had succeeded — 
through writing — in taking away the power held by pontiffs and opening access to 
the management of legal problems, investing a new class of jurists. 
Printing techniques were known already a thousand years before Christ. Still, 
the third revolution we are interested in took place in the mid-15th century when 
Johannes Gutenberg introduced the first movable type printing system in Europe. 
The technology of printing played a key role in the scientific revolution as well as 
in the birth of the modern state and modern law systems. Printing technologies 
made it possible to spread learning to the masses. However, they also served as a 
very useful tool for creating a monopoly on normative production in the modern 
state (especially, but not exclusively, in civil law countries). 
Law was changing. This period marked the beginning of a process that led after 
the French Revolution to the emergence of the code as the main instrument of 
expression of the lawmaker’s will [Grossi P., 2010]. In the nineteenth century, law 
became code, although this development had already been foreseen by Thomas 
Hobbes in 1651. Napoleonic legislation was the symbol of this change: all law was 
incorporated into codes, and there is no law outside the code. This approach obvi-
ously excluded all non-state sources, such as natural law, customs, and so on, from 
the legal landscape. Law became a complete and self-sufficient system. This legal 
theory or, more precisely, legal ideology was established two centuries ago and still 
plays an important role today.
We have finally arrived at the fourth revolution  — the digital revolution  — 
which we are experiencing today (perhaps without being fully aware of it). It 
would be a mistake to consider the ICT revolution only as the development of 
new instruments for law. Far from simply providing tools for law, the great ICT 
transformations changed its very nature.
The digital revolution raises the question: is law computable [Deakin S.F., Mar-
kou C., 2020]? In other words, the central problem today is to understand whether 
everything we call law can be formalized and reduced to a system of machine-
readable signs [Brownsword R., 2020]. A problem of this kind would have amused 
people until the middle of the last century. Today, it no longer makes us laugh. 
Indeed, we have to take it very seriously.
Attempts that seemed to be ramblings a few decades ago must now be con-
sidered carefully and perhaps even with concern. We could try to lock ourselves 
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up in the ivory tower of twentieth-century scholars faithful to Roman law codes 
and say that law has nothing to do with such things. Nevertheless, we must face 
reality. And reality shows that this kind of approach is increasingly employed and 
already affecting the way law works. Software systems based on machine learning 
techniques have been used for years by the biggest law firms in the United States 
and Asia. So, we are faced with a real problem. Closing our eyes and behaving like 
ostriches will not bring us very far.
3. Tech for law and law for tech.  
Old rights changing, new rights emerging
The first way we can look at the connection between law and digital technol-
ogies moves from technology to law. In essence, we can examine the tools that 
technology has provided to law in recent years. This is what is commonly called 
lawtech.
Lawtech is the term we use to describe technologies that aim to support, supple-
ment or replace traditional methods for delivering legal services or that improve 
the way the judicial system operates. Lawtech covers a wide range of tools and pro-
cesses, including legal research, document automation, smart contracts, drafting 
automation, electronic dispute resolution, e-discovery and many other processes 
in law firms [Ashley K.D., 2019]. Such systems are already available. They can draft 
documents, perform legal research, disclose documents in litigation, provide legal 
guidance, and resolve disputes online.
All these tools are used by lawyers to perform their professional activities. Nev-
ertheless, there is, of course, another issue that also matters to those who are not 
lawyers or judges: what tools can we use today to enforce our old rights? One 
example is the adoption of an electronic voting system. Obviously, it must be 
provided with all sorts of possible guarantees defending the constitutional values 
that are at stake. However, there are also more trivial examples such as the use of 
electronic mail or other electronically certified mail systems, electronic signatures, 
biometric keys and many other instruments with which we can enter into safe and 
reliable contact with the public administration to ask questions, make requests 
and protect our rights. 
However, this perspective, too, goes from technology to law by providing tools 
for law. Let us try to reverse this perspective and look from law to technology. Let 
us consider how law is trying to address new problems in an increasingly digital 
society.
Someone has said that technology is an enabler of rights rather than a right in 
itself. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether this statement can be successfully de-
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fended today. The two examples that come to mind are the right to Internet access 
and the right to Internet neutrality. Nevertheless, even without thinking about 
new rights, we can say that the digital revolution is radically changing the way old 
rights work, because there is no area of our social life — and therefore of the legal 
system — that is not affected by technological innovations. It suffices to think of 
the protection of personal data, which is increasingly overlapping with our iden-
tity: we are becoming what Google tells us about us, even if we do not like it at all. 
Or take the related issue of the freedom of expression, which must be balanced 
with the right to privacy. Or the freedom of association on the Internet, the exer-
cise of consumer rights in e-commerce, the rights of workers (with the problem of 
surveillance at the workplace), the right to education (even in the form of remote 
education that has appeared in recent months), and so on.
New technologies are generating new rights and changing the way old rights are 
exercised. At the same time, they are creating new criminal activities and chang-
ing the way traditional crimes are carried out. Just a few examples: if you write on 
Facebook that I am a complete idiot, this is defamation; if you find the password 
to my e-mail account and peek into my correspondence, this is a violation of pri-
vacy as well as abusive access to a computer system; if you flood me with phone 
calls, instant messages, and emails, this is stalking; if you find some embarrassing 
photos on a portable storage device and want to send them to my wife, this is ex-
tortion; and, if you try to sell me the Trevi Fountain with an eBay ad, well, this is 
fraud. In all these cases, traditional crimes are performed using new technologies. 
Moreover, new crimes are appearing, too [Pagallo U., 2013].
The most common term for crimes committed exclusively through digital 
technologies is cybercrimes”. Sadly, we are becoming familiar with such terms 
as phishing”, revenge porn”, ransomware”, and maas”. At the same time, we are 
becoming increasingly aware of the importance of cybersecurity.
Obviously, the first thing that comes to mind when we talk about illegal activi-
ties committed through information technologies are crimes against the person or 
against things and property. Then we think of state law. However, there is another 
issue of fundamental importance here: computer crimes are, by their very nature, 
transnational. Expressions and concepts such as locus commissi delicti have to be 
reviewed and completely changed, if necessary. There is another crucial aspect: 
cyber-attacks can also have relevance under international law. Contemporary in-
ternational law is not only faced with the major problem of the military use of 
high-tech instruments such as drones. The very concept of war is changing. One 
mistake we often make is to consider cyberwarfare as a virtual war, as if it were 
a PlayStation or Xbox game. However, this is wrong. Cyberwarfare is real war — 
a war in the true sense of the word — because it can cause exactly the same damage 
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as traditional weapons. An example would be the cybernetic attack on the Iranian 
nuclear base in Natanz a few years ago.
4. Norm and technology  
are strongly interrelated concepts 
In view of the complex scenario depicted so far, we can easily understand how 
human behaviour is increasingly influenced by a complex of factors of a digital 
nature on which artificial intelligence (AI) is based. As a result, AI is beginning 
to play a similar role to traditional codes of written rules designed to regulate the 
actions of a particular group.
Thus, the digital code is becoming a form of regulation that is making private 
actors link their values to technological artefacts that prove capable of conditioning 
their actions at a material and moral level. Consequently, norms in the sense we are 
giving them here must be considered as regulatory tools that make use of algorithms 
to regulate, whether directly or indirectly, the behaviour of the subjects they refer to.
Norms and technologies therefore form a complex relationship, interacting 
through a system of dependencies and interdependencies that contribute to the 
regulation of individual behaviour to a greater or lesser extent.
With the advent of modern information and communication technologies, the 
relationship between law and technologies has changed radically, as evidenced by 
the growing use of technologies as a complement to (and support for) law; this 
can be understood, according to some authors [De Filippi P., Hassan S., 2016: 
3 ff.], by distinguishing four recent phases that explain the relationship between 
norms and technologies. The first stage, which is currently very advanced already, 
uses digitized information, replacing paper and ink by complex data available on 
computers and giving users a huge corpus of jurisprudential cases, laws and regu-
lations that were initially available for a fee through large databases yet have been 
gradually placed in open access [Berring R.C., 1986]. The second stage involves 
the automation of decision-making processes: most of the research carried out by 
legal information technologies focuses on translating regulatory provisions into 
computer code. Both policy makers and judges use IT applications to derive regu-
latory provisions and jurisprudential guidelines and to analyse and compare them 
in order to structure arguments that are adequate for the purpose and improve 
the decision-making process [Waterman D., Paul R., Peterson R., 1986: 212 ff.]. 
However, this objective can only be achieved with difficulty, not least because 
of the ambiguity that can characterize legal language and of the need for rules 
to be flexible and linked to factuality [Grossi P., 2014]. Despite these difficulties, 
government institutions and the global business community are trying to create 
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automatic and semi-automatic decision-making processes (e.g., specific IT appli-
cations for taxation) on the basis of the experience of different sectors such as 
healthcare and fiscal and financial regulation. The third stage has witnessed the 
transformation of legal rules into algorithms, on the one hand, and the emergence 
of regulation through algorithms, on the other.
With the widespread diffusion of the Internet, we are witnessing the de facto 
emergence of new forms of regulation that increasingly rely on soft law (i.e., tech-
nical rules) for disciplining human behaviour with an ever-greater number of in-
teractions being governed by computer programs and with technological support 
providing significant assistance not only for taking decisions but also for the direct 
implementation of rules. In this context, algorithms can assist in identifying what 
is or is not admissible in regulating legal relationships, thereby making the rules 
of application much more efficient [Reidenberg J.R., 1998; 553]. During the fourth 
stage, which has just begun, one is developing a new approach to regulation (the 
so-called codification of the standard”), which involves a growing use of computer 
codes not only for implementing but also for elaborating legal rules.
5. The impact of technological artefacts  
on policy makers’ strategies
As an indispensable tool in all areas of human existence, information tech-
nologies are playing a central role in contemporary life that has been marked in 
recent years by the growing influence of certain basic phenomena such as ma-
chines with increased autonomy and the capacity for self-learning. The latter stand 
out through their complexity and, above all, their ability to elaborate, predict and 
plan the human decision-making process, which supports the idea of the gradually 
growing role of AI in human existence [Christian B., Griffiths T., 2016].
It is therefore not surprising to observe that the development of these types of 
machines raises some difficult questions about the way in which human beings 
can adopt a predictive attitude and how this can influence, in a more or less reli-
able way, the prediction of the future.
The fact is that technological tools had existed as a means of implementing 
regulatory data long before the advent of modern information technologies.
Thus, far from being neutral means, technological artefacts are profoundly sub-
ject to the influence of laws adopted by policy makers, which indicate the type of 
actions to be prohibited or condoned [Mowshowitz A., 1984].
If political choices are, either intentionally or unintentionally, incorporated 
into the way technology is structured and if these different configurations have a 
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significant social impact insofar as they support certain political groups or facilitate 
certain actions or behaviour towards others [Winner L., 1980: 234 ff.], then we may 
speak of four forces that exist and combine, to a greater or lesser extent, to shape 
individual actions in ways that are often beyond the control of the individual: the 
law, social norms, the market and the composition of spaces [Lessig L., 1999].
The law creates artificial constraints that limit the actions of individuals by legal 
rules (for example, prohibiting theft and punishing those who violate this rule), 
social norms regulate cultural behaviour through peer pressure (for example, it is 
not acceptable to speak aloud during a professional meeting), the market encour-
ages or discourages certain behaviour by resorting to the mechanism of supply and 
demand (for example, by predicting prices for certain goods or services), while the 
composition of spaces — i.e., the way in which the surrounding world is structured 
both naturally and artificially — imposes a series of limitations that affect the type of 
actions that an individual can undertake (for example, biology, technology or geog-
raphy) [Malone G., 2008: 139]; [Yeung K., 2010]; [Semeraro M., 2012: 808]; [Sirena 
P., 2014: 3 ff.]; [Enriques L., 2009: 1147] (including an-depth discussion of the impact 
of regulation on the financial market); [Andenas M., Deipenbrock G., 2016].
The unprecedented diffusion of information technologies and the globalized 
network have contributed to the creation of a new environment for human beings 
and their behaviour, whose rules are implemented in algorithms. Just as any other 
technological artefact, this algorithm reflects different kinds of choices, especially 
in the political domain [Christian B., Griffiths T., 2016].
The algorithm can, therefore, form the basis of a new construct capable of con-
ditioning individual human actions through the use of technological tools. What 
impact, then, can the algorithm have on the traditional regulatory scheme, whose 
primary referents are the regulator and the law?
Although technological infrastructures can be structured to promote or pre-
vent certain types of behaviour, the desired effect cannot always be guaranteed, 
as technological tools are used for different purposes that may depend on specific 
contingencies.
The implications deriving from the use of particular technologies, therefore, 
cannot be fully grasped without viewing them in the social and historical context 
where the technologies are meant to operate. In fact, more than its structure, it is 
the way in which a technology is meant to operate according to the choices made 
by a particular group of individuals that determines its influence on the social and 
political spheres.
Regardless of whether or not this effect is intentional, the digital world opens the 
doors to new forms of regulation that are entrusted to private actors who seek to im-
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pose their values by embedding them in a given technological tool, which, depend-
ing on the concrete use to which it is put, can influence the way a certain number of 
individuals behave [Jeorges B., 1999: 428]. In a nutshell, it is possible to describe the 
relationship between regulators, norms and algorithms in terms of conflicting ener-
gies: whereas regulators try to control socio-economic dynamics with their rules, 
algorithms can create regulations that have their own legitimacies if they have been 
previously legitimized by the public sphere from which they take their binding force. 
6. The two-way relationship binding rules and algorithms: 
towards the need for flexibility and prediction
The framework outlined so far shows that there is a two-way functional ex-
change between norms and algorithms. Thus, while the use of algorithms aims to 
reinforce the application of normative data, the latter can also serve as a tool for 
strengthening the correct and adequate use of algorithms to avoid their violation 
or alteration. The fact remains that the transposition of legal rules into techni-
cal rules, which requires the elaboration of an algorithm as a means of defining 
the application of normative data, is not an easy operation insofar as, unlike legal 
rules that are developed using a language that is intrinsically ambiguous, techni-
cal rules must be transposed into codes and are therefore based on algorithms 
and mathematical models. It is the peculiar ambiguity of the legal system, which 
is necessary to ensure an adequate and potentially flexible application of the rule 
on a casuistic basis, that allows algorithm programmers to incorporate their own 
understanding of normative data into the technical artefact they are developing — 
the algorithm [on the specific problem of the configurability of the new type of al-
gorithmic responsibility, see [Ruffolo U., 2017: 148]. Thus, although it is true that, 
in the digital world, the algorithm is increasingly assuming some of the functions 
traditionally ascribed to legal operators (in particular, judges), it is also true that, 
in recent years, law has increasingly begun to take on the features of the computer 
code [Lessig L., 2000: 1]. (The recommendations on the use and impact of artificial 
intelligence are particularly relevant at the EU level. They have been developed by 
the European Commission and disseminated through the adoption of the Euro-
pean Ethical Charter for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and 
Related Areas on December 4, 2018, and of the European Communication Build-
ing Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence on April 8, 2019.)
The characteristics of the norm thus constructed should essentially translate 
into a high level of malleability and adaptability, allowing individuals to experi-
ment with a wide range of versions and adaptations of the same rule, and into an 
ex ante implementation of technical rules with the respective legal implications, 
which could also derive from a predictive key.
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While codes and algorithms have begun to be used on a major scale in recent 
years, we are also witnessing the gradual delegation to technologies of fundamental 
activities embodied in the interpretation and application of regulatory provisions 
or, at least, of attempts to do so, which, assuming different degrees of complexity 
and articulation, allow the achievement of increasingly valuable, appreciable and 
technically sophisticated results.
However, it is not always easy to transpose wet code into dry code: while the 
former makes use of intrinsically malleable language and can be applied, on a ca-
suistic basis, to an indefinite number of hypotheses that may not have been fore-
seen in detail from the start (abstract and general rules), the latter employs a pre-
cise and formalized language with well-defined categories and a methodological 
choice that must be established ex ante.
For this reason, it can be argued that the norm is progressively transforming itself 
into a code: the more provisions are implemented through the use of technologies, 
the more codes acquire the status of regulatory techniques that can be used both to 
define regulatory and contractual provisions and to incorporate them into codes.
The elaboration in codified form of legislative and contractual provisions ul-
timately entails a further consequence  — namely, that rules are traditionally 
conceived in sufficiently broad, abstract and general terms so as to be applied to 
a variety of different situations and to have a binding effect both at the time of 
promulgation and in new and unforeseen situations that are factually different 
from those contemplated in the original norm but show similar traits at the prac-
tical and ideological level. For this reason, the standard must be read and recon-
structed in its scope by the interpreter before being applied.
For a long time, norms were drafted by human beings and intended to be ap-
plied to and by other human beings. As a result, they needed human judgement 
to give them meaning that would take into account the intentions of the legislator 
and therefore consider the context and the contingencies that existed at the time 
the norm was drawn up [for a further discussion of the interpretation of rules, see, 
among others [Mengoni L., 1996: 103–114]; [Alpa G., 2017: 35].
Because of this ambiguity and flexibility, regulatory and contractual provisions 
cannot be transposed into code and automatically implemented unless they are 
anchored to a formal language whose high degree of technicality can only be pro-
cessed and grasped by a machine. However, this would entail the simultaneous 
rejection of genericity and abstraction for the sake of an ever more precise formu-
lation that could be interpreted more objectively than before.
The result of this process would be the greater ease in transforming provisions 
into codes that, thanks to the corresponding algorithms, entail automatic applica-
14
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bility facilitated by the use of technological tools. However, the trend towards an 
increasingly formalized language that allows the code to be rigid and penetrating 
in its application mechanisms contradicts the traditional concept of a norm per-
ceived as flexible and adequately ambiguous.
The judge, however, cannot limit his/her functions to simply declaring the 
norm and intervening constructively only in the event of its indeterminacy, inso-
far as codes that are based on a detailed regulation of the activity of interpretation 
must be drafted in such a way as to allow the legal operator to clarify the will of 
the legislator. Only in this way can judicial discretion expressed in interpretative 
activity be preserved even in times of codification.
If, then, the computer code, like any other technological tool, can reflect politi-
cal interests and if its way of being structured can have significant implications for 
the work of many individuals, the call for greater flexibility must be heeded. Since 
codes cannot be complete or regulate all cases faced by judges, they must refer to 
further sources of law and allow for the relativization of their use. Only in this 
way can the authentically human function of legal operator recover its real scope 
through the importance assigned to details. While the latter are often ignored by 
the objectivized operation of the computer code, they can acquire enormous im-
portance in a specific case and bring out its most characteristic and specialized 
traits, both at the national and at the European levels.
7. Algorithmic surveillance
The impact of the algorithm is of utmost relevance not only in regulation but 
also in the concomitant process of surveillance. Indeed, a number of questions 
may arise about the impact of algorithmic decision-making on the idea and prac-
tice of liberty [Brownsword R., 2019]. One of the biggest concerns today relates to 
the power of national and big tech companies to make surveys with the help of big 
data analytics and other powerful means of automatic computation [Pasquale F., 
2015]; [Zuboff S., 2019]. This is why the power of technology must be subject to 
rules no less than any other licit or illicit power.
The massive use of algorithms has improved people’s lives. Each new tech-
nological development creates new opportunities and changes the way humans 
relate to each other [Rifkin J., 2014]. Today, we know that these improvements 
have a price”. All these beautiful technological devices that few of us are willing to 
abandon expose us to the reasonable certainty of being potentially monitored at 
any time: they produce not only a positive enhancement of the human and a new 
kind of addiction but also a new slavery”, as writes in his recent book Remo Bodei 
[Bodei R., 2019].
15
Stefano Dorigo, Ettore M. Lombardi, Erik Longo, Stefano Pietropaoli. The Phenomenon... Р. 3–34
We take for granted that the benefits — security, efficiency, protection, rewards, 
and convenience — compensate for the fact that our personal data is recorded, stored, 
recovered, crossed, traded and exchanged through surveillance systems. Since ordi-
nary people have no reason to question surveillance (the nothing to hide misconcep-
tion) [Schneier B., 2015: 446], the order built by the system is strengthened, allowing 
people to be normalized (as Foucault would have said) by the system [Lyon D., 2003].
Because of the massive use of technology, we are now subject to a new form of 
surveillance that has a more profound impact on the freedom of individuals, being 
intrusive and invasive in private life [Lyon D., 2001]. Explicit and non-explicit forms 
of surveillance affect virtually all forms of human interaction. In addition, surveil-
lance has become ubiquitous and continuous, and we can no longer evade it. 
Over the past twenty years, surveillance, counter-terrorism, pandemic, and us, 
four elements that formerly had nothing in common, have become more closely 
connected than we could have ever imagined. Tools formerly employed only for 
targeted surveillance are now in common use. Applied only selectively before, they 
can now be used by anyone and at any moment, even with no particular purpose. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese and Korean authorities have used — 
in addition to more familiar authoritarian techniques of control — data from the 
world’s most sophisticated mass surveillance systems to track infected people. 
This has not always had positive outcomes and, in any event, taken place at the 
expense of citizens’ rights [Joe C., 2020; Mozur P., 2018]. Other governments have 
implemented extraordinary measures limiting the exercise of fundamental rights 
and civil liberties in order to stop the spread of the disease: among the other mea-
sures, surveillance has played a major role in compelling people to stay at home or 
limit their social activities.
The pandemic has also increased the relevance of the power of algorithms over 
us. In a world where connections have replaced social relations [Simoncini A., 
2020], our smart devices have become not only tools of communication but also 
indispensable means for studying, working, training, and entertaining, as well as 
for being watched.
In our soft and liquid society [Bauman Z., 2006], forms of control and surveil-
lance have multiplied [Hijmans H., 2016]. However, differently than in the past, 
they are no longer the exclusive prerogative of institutional powers, as Jeremy 
Bentham [1995] has shown. Today, they profoundly depend on the participation 
of those being surveilled: not only being watched but also watching has become a 
way of life [Lyon D., 2018].
If we apply the Marxist interpretation of capitalism to this industry, we can 
understand how and why simple forms of surveillance have turned into mass sur-
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veillance [Gambetta D., 2018] thanks to the parallel tendency of the Internet to 
create societal benefits while making the protection of some fundamental values 
ineffective [ECHR, 2015]. We have gone far beyond the mere exploitation of our 
data, as Shoshana Zuboff explains: You are not the product; you are the aban-
doned carcass. The ‘product’ derives from the surplus that is ripped from your life 
[Zuboff S., 2019].
As the EU Court of Justice has pointed out, mass surveillance can be imple-
mented by both governments and private companies, and it is likely to produce in 
the minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the sub-
ject of constant surveillance”1. In both cases, we see surveillance that is intrusive of 
people’s lives and entails the loss of control of individuals over their personal data. 
Mass surveillance, which takes the form of seeing and being in the digital mi-
lieu, is inseparable from the so-called data exhaust pouring from millions of ma-
chines every moment of every day and the greedy global effort to create value from 
them [Lyon D., 2018: 170]. People strive to be connected, amused, entertained, 
supplied, updated, reassured and informed by the power of digital life. Gather-
ing data from people and groups is made possible by numerous means today, in-
cluding photography, video, genetic footprints, fingerprints, and face recognition. 
Furthermore, databases can be interconnected through cloud storage, and data 
can be extracted and immediately aggregated from multiple sources. However, as 
we engage in online life, we not only perceive being subtly watched by an external 
power but also employ surveillance tools from within in many contexts and for 
many purposes [Accoto C., 2019]. Surveillance is indeed welcomed as a means to 
attain greater security, convenience, and efficiency [Cohen J., 2016] and only sel-
dom queried or resisted as being inappropriate or excessive [Lyon D., 2018: 151].
The result of these changes is that today all of us are more dependent on sur-
veillance mechanisms than in the past. However, the result of this unprecedented 
revolution is different from anything we have seen before, as we are now not only 
passive subjects of surveillance but also active masters of it. Indeed, when we in-
tegrate everyday life with surveillance technologies, we expose ourselves to them 
and, more profoundly, participate in them to make them possible, legitimate and 
institutional. It has been said that surveillance is the fertilizer behind smart devices 
and the Internet of Things. 
Furthermore, surveillance is convenient both for the controller and the con-
trolled, since it gives the latter a sense of security and protection (surveillance is 
intrinsically ambiguous [Lyon, 2003: 11]). Our societies are increasingly based on 
1 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (C-293/12) and Seitlinger 
(C-594/12), EU:C:2014:238, par. 37.
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security anxiousness [Greenwald G., 2014] that is generated by the odd perception 
of menace to our security and the corresponding demand for abnormal protection 
[Lyon D., 2003: 11].
The effects of these systems and processes should be understood from an em-
pirical point of view but also with regard to the profound social, economic, po-
litical and anthropological changes that they entail. While surveillance remains 
an aspect of social control that is always present in human relationships, mass 
surveillance points to the emergence of a different conception of life and society.
This may well be the real point of departure of the idea that code as the archi-
tecture of the Internet is capable of constraining the actions of individuals via 
technological means [Lessig L., 2006].
The implications for liberty should not be underestimated, insofar as private 
freedoms and democratic participation can be moulded in accordance with what 
business and government know about individuals [Benkler Y., 2011].
However, the emerging era of big data does not only entail the progressive loss 
of control over personal information but also shows the incapacity of govern-
ments to deliver protection [Hijmans, 2016].
The logic of exchanging privacy for convenience and efficiency amplifies the 
weakness of the notice and consent paradigm upon which the legality of data treat-
ment rests [Yeung K., Lodge M., 2019]. In this situation, it is practically impossible 
for individuals to provide meaningful and voluntary consent to the activities entailed 
in algorithms (for a discussion of the uncertainties related to privacy in the context 
of big data, see [Acquisti A., Brandimarte L., Loewenstein G., 2015: 509–514]).
8. If it is no longer possible to evade surveillance,  
can we protect ourselves from it? 
The legitimacy and accountability of this kind of surveillance is at stake due to 
the secrecy and the cooperation of the private sector in government surveillance, 
as a result of which surveillance activities, whether targeted or massive, are threat-
ening constitutional guarantees. 
To be legitimate and guarantee data protection and other constitutional free-
doms, surveillance tools and algorithms should be designed and used with a view 
to their purpose (as set out in Article 9 of the GDPR), proportionality and effects 
for individuals (one of the most important rights is the empowerment of individu-
als”, which must be assured by improving the ability of individuals to control their 
data as set out in Article 16 of TFEU [Hijmans H., 2016]). While this is easy to 
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codify, it is difficult to implement in practice for many reasons that mostly involve 
technological issues. 
Examples of how the development of surveillance systems can infringe on free-
dom and democracy are abundant. The most striking cases today relate to the use 
of face recognition software — probably, the most controversial mass surveillance 
tool used today.
One of the most recent examples of the dangers of this technology concerns the 
small company Clearview that has written a code for face recognition better than 
any application available so far. It is so powerful that over 600 US law enforcement 
agencies have bought Clearview in recent years [Hill K., 2020]. 
Clearview has done something extremely invasive on today’s Internet to beat 
its competitors. It has massively harnessed photos uploaded on Facebook, Insta-
gram, and Twitter and videos on YouTube to create an immense archive at the 
disposal of its powerful algorithm. The same reporter of The New York Times that 
covered this story discovered some unknown photos of herself. Not surprisingly, 
it was Clearview’s algorithm to trace such pictures on the web by matching them 
with her name. The algorithm seems to survey data silently, waiting for the mo-
ment when stored and indexed information becomes useful for face recognition. 
Considering the kind of data accumulated, we can conjecture that this is the big-
gest database ever built [O’Flaherty K., 2020]. Clearview has sold its face recogni-
tion service to the FBI and hundreds of local police offices, which are using it for 
solving extremely difficult cases [Schuba T., 2020]. Currently, Clearview is targeted 
by a lawsuit alleging violations of privacy law in Illinois2. Meanwhile, the US Sen-
ate has introduced several bills regulating the use of such technologies in law en-
forcement activities3.
This example shows how forms of targeted surveillance that were developed 
for monitoring and apprehending terrorists could become systems of mass sur-
veillance if used on a massive scale. The Clearview case sheds light on the loss 
of control over personal information in an algorithmic society in which public 
institutions do not consider the dangers of outsourcing services to systems that 
collect, capture or otherwise obtain personal data without informing the subjects 
of these activities. In addition, it is evident that any face recognition system must 
also include a mechanism for assessing the risks produced by the deployment of 
this technology in society and the secondary use of data for other purposes. The 
analysis of the impact of face recognition systems must therefore compare the cur-
rent situation (for example, supervision and recognition by human agents) with a 
2 Hall v. Clearview AI, Inc. et al (Case No. 20-cv-00846).
3 S.2878 and S.3284 — 116th Congress (2019–2020).
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scenario based on the implementation of automatic recognition with the help of 
data uploaded on publicly accessible social platforms (for a discussion of the legal 
issues created by face recognition, see the recent report [FRA, 2019b]).
Particularly worrisome is the use of face recognition tools in school for secu-
rity purposes [Weinstein N., 1980: 806–820]. At the moment, the introduction of 
such technologies is forbidden by national data protection authorities (Sweden 
and France) and administrative judges (France). As far as we can see, the real issue 
at stake in such cases is the use and storage of data — namely, the extent to which 
school and other authorities keep data about students and the level of security that 
they apply in managing them.
In view of this situation, many scholars have argued, following David Lyon, 
that the advent of the superpanopticon”, whose main characteristic is total and 
uninterrupted surveillance by states [Lyon D., 2003], has taken place over the last 
twenty years. This may seem to imply that more power over citizens has been 
concentrated in the hands of states, yet a closer look shows that this conclusion is 
wrong for many reasons [Tincani P., 2015: 72–87]. The superpanopticon increases 
the de facto power of legitimate dominion only in the event when the latter has a 
monopoly on the (legitimate) means of power and control. In contrast, techno-
logical transformation has increased private powers, giving them a tremendous 
ability to control and monitor people in addition to states [Lyon, 2018]. More-
over, the power of surveillance and the concentration of the data gathered by both 
public and private mechanisms is focused on a small number of actors, public and 
private, based mainly in one jurisdiction and leading to a rapid erosion of state 
sovereignty and democracy [Pinto R., 2019].
The supervised society — a society in which surveillance can be infinitely ex-
tended until it observes the entire population — is achievable only if surveillance is 
automated, which requires the availability of powerful technological means.
9. The protection of fundamental rights
Let us examine the specific new technologies (in particular, technologies for 
mass surveillance) that are currently presenting the biggest challenges to freedom 
and democracy. 
New technologies with algorithmic power are being continuously developed 
and rapidly deployed despite inadequate transparency, high uncertainty, and little 
knowledge of the exact data processing techniques (for a description of the problem, 
see [Yeung K., 2018: 505–523]). Today, this process is accelerating to such an extent 
that some people are speaking of a Cambrian explosion of technologies with poten-
tially harmful implications [Kurzweil R., 2004: 381–416]; [Pratt G., 2015: 51–60].  
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In the context of algorithmic governance, we are continuously being faced 
with algorithmic unknowns”, especially in the case of machine learning [An-
drews, 2019a: 210–211]. The problem of machine learning algorithms becom-
ing too complicated for humans to understand is a major concern in view of the 
widespread necessity of building administrative capacity in this field [Andrews L., 
2019b: 296–310]. 
The problem of the unknown or black box effect is surely one of the most im-
portant issues today, particularly due to the harmful or discriminatory effects of 
some algorithms. 
From a constitutional point of view, this situation has come into conflict with 
basic data protection principles set down in the GDPR [De Gregorio G., 2018: 65]. 
These principles aim at structuring and limiting the processing of personal data 
and making it transparent for data subjects4. In addition, personal data should be 
processed only for specified and explicit purposes, as the Clearview case shows. 
Data processed through machine-learning AI is based on large data volumes that 
are used for training and testing and that have been collected for other purposes 
and may be not suitable for new functions. Thus, AI comes into conflict with the 
basic conception of the current data protection law because in many cases even the 
programmers — particularly in the case of unsupervised learning — are no longer 
able to comprehend how AI obtains its results [Marsch N., 2020: 33–52]. While 
the GDPR counteracts the imbalance created by the platform economy by giving 
individuals powerful rights in the new arena where private powers are dominant, 
simply attributing new rights does not solve the asymmetry of power.
This perspective leads to a further concern. Algorithms collect and process vast 
quantities of personal and biometric data, making individuals highly visible to the 
public eye [Van Dijck J., 2014: 197–208]. These processes not only make individuals 
susceptible to private monitoring and profiling but also put privacy and democratic 
values at risk, since they increase the online transparency of citizens and reduce the 
sphere of their autonomy [Richards N., 2015: 168]. This new transparency reverses, 
for example, the presumption of innocence and generally diminishes the zone of 
individual freedom, as scholars have pointed out [Reidenberg J., 2014: 583].
The right to individual self-development can only be exercised by people who 
have control of their own lives (self-determination). Constitutionally speaking, 
this presupposes the protection of informational self-determination”, as the ca-
pacity of the individual to determine the disclosure and use of his personal data”5. 
4 Cf. Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR.
5 German (Federal) Constitutional Court 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83 ‘Census 
Judgment’ (15 December 1983), par. 155.
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Rather than being an end in itself, this right is a means of protecting other funda-
mental rights –especially democracy and the freedom of expression6.
The last key element in this domain concerns the likely discriminatory effects 
produced by the automation of decision-making due to its inexplicability and un-
predictability [Bygrave L., 2014: 220]. This applies particularly to the aspects of 
discrimination and persuasion, since individuals might not know that they are be-
ing discriminated against or persuaded or even that this can happen at all7. In this 
context, it is important to note the possible negative implications for fundamental 
rights (the right to non-discrimination, economic and social rights, the equality 
between men and women, the access to a fair trial and effective remedies, and the 
right to private and family life, as well as the protection of personal data) produced 
by machine-learning algorithms fed with low-quality data [FRA, 2019a].
10. A representative example of the impact  
of digitalization on the regulative and supervisory  
dimension: algorithmic revolution and tax law
At this point of our analysis, it is of paramount importance to consider an even 
more practical aspect of the thesis so far elaborated. As one easily sees, the dema-
terialization of the usual activities of digital multinationals thanks to algorithms 
makes it difficult to identify the territory in which these multinationals act and 
obtain their income. Therefore, the two fundamental concepts of international 
taxation — source and residence — are put into question [Pistone P., 2016: 395 ff.].
The fact that digital business is based on dematerialized goods and services 
abolishes physical presence in a specific jurisdiction through such material struc-
tures as offices, factories, and warehouses. Digital business is free to move across 
states without particular difficulty, since it is not linked to any territory by forms of 
stable and tangible presence that would not be easily moveable by their very nature 
[Brauner Y., 2018: 462 ff.]; [Cipollina S., 2014: 21 ff.]. At the same time, even the 
source of income becomes malleable, since transactions are dematerialized, often 
conducted in a non-place (such as the cloud), and are not linked to the production 
and delivery of a good that can be placed in a certain physical space: they depend 
on the location of the user with his device, an uncertain and changeable element 
by its very nature. The identification of the state with the right to tax relevant in-
come is, therefore, called into question [De Wilde M., 2015: 796 ff.]. Moreover, in 
6 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb 27, 2008, 120 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 274 (F.R.G.).
7 In the European context, this was the case of the judgment made by the court in Google 
Spain and Google v CNIL.
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the context of the digital economy, there is uncertainty in the determination of 
taxable income, since most of the time the user does not pay a sum of money but 
accesses services free of charge by providing his/her personal data; it is therefore 
difficult to determine the economic value of a transaction for a company. One of 
the main characteristics of the digital economy often emphasized by the OECD is 
the economic exploitation of hard-to-value intangibles: hard-to-value intangibles 
[…] means intangibles that the current arm’s-length-based transfer pricing regime 
is unable to regulate [Brauner Y., 2014: 98 ff.].
The fiscal consequences of the use of algorithms can also be seen in the field 
of intelligent machines employed in industrial production. Due to its relation to 
physical goods sold against payments on traditional markets, there are no prob-
lems related to the residence of the company or to the identification of its source 
of income. However, in some situations, companies can gain a competitive advan-
tage over others by investing in automation and thus achieving higher production 
levels at lower cost. This entails the replacement of human labour (including, to a 
certain extent, intellectual labour) by machines with a consequent loss of revenue 
for the state, since workers who lose their jobs to robots stop receiving wages and 
are therefore no longer subject to income tax. This creates problems for public cof-
fers, all the more so as they have to finance social support measures for different 
categories of workers expelled from the production system. It should be said that 
some analysts have called for public intervention to protect weaker categories of 
workers. They propose, among other things, creating a national dividend by mak-
ing each technological enterprise confer part of its actions to a public trust so that 
every member of the community becomes a de facto shareholder. Rather than dis-
couraging the development of robotics by introducing a tax, the national dividend 
would allow all members of a given society to have a decent standard of living even 
if all human workers were replaced by robots [Varoufakis Y., 2017].
As in all revolutions, new and unexpected situations arise rapidly (and violent-
ly — understood not in a physical sense but with reference to the incisiveness of 
the change that they impose on previous situations) and, as such, are not covered 
by the legal regulations in force, albeit the latter are designed and implemented for 
very different situations. At the same time, there emerges a category of subjects 
(whether digital multinationals or manufacturing companies capable of automat-
ing their production processes) that are able to take advantage of such situations, 
drawing fiscal benefits that may be lawful, as they are generated in strict compli-
ance with the rules in force, yet act to the detriment of both competitors and the 
community and ultimately put the social pact to a very severe test. Finally, as a 
consequence of the two elements just mentioned, there appear clear ruptures in 
the economic and social order with the drain of public resources and the simulta-
neous emergence of social tensions fuelled both by small local businesses, pressed 
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by digitization, and by the mass of workers for whom the social protection of the 
state becomes increasingly insufficient (in particular, due to the loss of revenue 
mentioned above).
In short, the fiscal component of the algorithmic revolution first impacts the 
economy and then (just as all revolutions) spills over to society and public systems 
designed to ensure its prosperity.
One must therefore ask whether tax law, with its current principles and rules, is 
able to cope with this emergency by mitigating social risks through a fair redistri-
bution of wealth among the affiliates or whether, on the contrary, it is not up to the 
task, as many of its basic concepts and institutions need to be rethought in view 
of lessons deriving from other branches of law (international and EU law as well 
as constitutional law), since what is at stake is not just tax revenues but the entire 
system of individual and collective rights, as well as the rules of the economy based 
on a level playing field and the social function of enterprises.
It seems that the most alarming consequence of the algorithmic revolution, 
seen through the prism of tax law, is not so much that some operators can generate 
unimaginable profits that can make them compete even with sovereign states but, 
rather, the fact that these profits are not, in the majority of cases, submitted to a 
fair level of taxation in the state (or states) where they are generated and where the 
need for a more intense participation in public expenditure is therefore greater. 
We are thus faced with a situation in which a more favourable tax position is at 
odds both with the inalienable solidaristic aspect of tax duty [Sacchetto C., Pezzi-
ni B., 2005]8 and with the social mission of enterprises that is now strongly emerg-
ing in doctrinal reflection and practice. This means that market advantage with the 
concomitant increase in available profits is not — as it should be — a presupposi-
tion for solidarity with the territorial and social communities that made it possible 
but, in a paradoxical reversal of the situation, is the result and consequence of the 
failure to fulfil one’s duty to contribute to the public expenditures of the state in 
which the value was created and, in a distinct yet related manner, to direct the self-
ish aims of the enterprise towards objectives of social utility (or at least towards 
not harming the local community).
8 The vast scope of the doctrinal debate on the function of taxation and its link, through the 
ability to pay, with the principles of substantial equality and solidarity prevents us from giving 
an adequate account here. We should simply say that scholarly studies on this subject often em-
phasize the connection between the contribution to public expenditures and the need to take 
into account the role of the taxpayer within the social organization [Gallo F., 1998]. It follows 
that taxation is an instrument through which the individual participates in the social organiza-
tion both as a person who benefits from goods and services made available by the state and as 
a contributor to the relevant expenses. Thus, if there is taxation, then there is a social structure 
within which the taxpayer moves.
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One therefore understands that, unless the fiscal consequences of the algorith-
mic revolution are regulated, they can call into question the very foundation of the 
social pact, to which the fiscal duty is connected as a manifestation of solidarity 
within an organised community, not only within the borders of an individual state 
but also in a wider sphere (as the experience of the European Union shows).
11. The possible reactions of the tax system:  
interventionism or laissez faire?
The question arises whether tax law can be made to play a positive role in the 
management and regulation of the situations described above [Lesage D., Vermei-
ren M., 2011: 43 ff.]. Opinions diverge on this matter. On the one hand, there exist 
advocates of a more incisive role of tax law in the sense that new forms of taxation 
should be imposed on new activities to allow states with ordinary tax regimes to 
recover revenues for their own welfare needs. On the other hand, there are those 
who value the role of the market, which is capable, or so they argue, of striking a 
balance between antagonistic conditions on its own. It has been held that automa-
tion and AI are not necessarily synonymous with technological unemployment 
and its negative effects and that technological change can, in fact, create new types 
of jobs [Falcão T., 2018: 127–131]. Indeed, the introduction of a levy with a balanc-
ing function could have the opposite effect, inducing the most advanced operators 
to abandon the state and depriving it of the advantages of their presence (in terms 
of investments and infrastructures). 
The first direction, which we could call sovereign”, promotes the strong role 
of state and the redistributive effect that taxes generate; the second (“liberalist or 
market”) approach opposes all regulation in the name of the trust in progress and 
the ability of the market to find a vaccine against the inequalities that new phe-
nomena initially produce. Both approaches seem weak, as they are based on con-
troversial assumptions. Indeed, the sovereign approach fails to resolve the prob-
lem of capital flight in the new economy as a result of the unilateral, and therefore 
uncoordinated, introduction of restrictive fiscal measures. Similarly, liberalist 
theories adopt an abstract philosophical vision that is increasingly refuted at the 
practical level on account of the persistent inequalities that favour only a few large 
operators to the detriment of most others.
A third way can be proposed. It seeks to combine economic freedom and the 
protection of the tax revenues of states by enhancing, as a balancing element, indi-
vidual and social rights in a supranational perspective. A multilateral approach is 
therefore needed, making it possible to regulate the activities of algorithmic com-
panies while avoiding the negative consequences of unilateral measures [Garcia 
Antòn R., 2016: 148 ff.]; [Pistone P., 2014: 3 ff.]. Multilateralism calls for synthesis 
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that would, on the one hand, ensure that national systems are incapable of exerting 
unfair competition by failing to comply with supranational guidelines and, on the 
other, reduce the gap with traditional companies. An example would be negotiat-
ing multilateral international instruments aimed at making states introduce uni-
form taxation systems for high-tech corporate income [Avi-Yonah R., 2015: 33 ff.] 
a guaranteed minimum level of taxation would protect the revenues of the most 
advanced states (and therefore the stability of national welfare systems), while the 
uniformity of rules, at least in the tax domain, would discourage multinationals 
from moving their businesses elsewhere in search of better conditions.
Without a doubt, such proposed tax measures are not new. Global tax gov-
ernance has been discussed for some time now now [Rosenblum D., Noked N., 
Helal M., 2014: 183 ff.]; [Stewart M., 2012: 152 ff.] and largely been accepted in 
principle. Some authors have observed that the traditional defensive model, which 
lies at the root of the concept of unilateral taxation, is giving way to a suprana-
tional approach based on international cooperation between states, even though 
this path is full of difficulties [Cipollina S., 2015: 356 ff.]. Such an approach has to 
be a substantial multilateral intervention, i.e., it should deal with the fundamental 
elements of taxation linked to the profits of the algorithmic economy. In short, the 
aim should be to sign an international agreement for introducing a global system 
of taxation introducing a minimum tax rate for income deriving from activities re-
lated to this economy that would be applied in every country. Two remarks should 
be made in this respect.
First of all, the OECD has been working for some time already on a common 
proposal to introduce a form of minimum tax in the digital economy [Englisch J., 
Becker J., 2019]: according to this project, the source state, in the event that the 
state of residence of the company does not, for some reason, levy taxes on the 
income it produces, would be entitled to intervene by levying a tax to attain the 
specified minimum level. The work of Pillar II of the BEPS project (also known 
as the global anti-base erosion or GLOBE proposal), which aims at introducing a 
minimum level of taxation on the profits of multinational enterprises [Pistone P., 
Nogueira J., Andrade B., Turina A., 2020], is proceeding slowly, yet the approach 
seems to be acceptable and could therefore be extended to the robotization of in-
dustry. One could specify, for example, that exceeding a certain level of automated 
production (measured by the degree of replacement of human workers by robots) 
should in any case lead to a greater imposition in the state where this phenomenon 
occurs or, failing that, in the states of the outlet markets for finished products.
The proposal of introducing a minimum level of taxation to be applied alter-
nately in states that show the political will to impose the new rule would have the 
effect of underlining the solidarity function of taxation as an instrument of par-
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ticipating in public expenditures for the benefit of all affiliates, including the less 
prosperous. It would not, in short, be a sanction against entrepreneurial phenom-
ena that are lawful and positive. The tax would, instead, serve to redistribute wealth 
not only within a single system (which is the function of taxation in state systems) 
but also in a supranational context. Here, the now irreversible interrelation between 
states, regional authorities and the international community requires the pursuit of 
broader redistributive tax justice that would fill the gaps not only between classes but 
also between different states [Essers P., 2014: 54 ff]; [Hongler P., 2019].
This perspective has very broad implications that can only be hinted at here. The 
current emergency caused by the coronavirus demonstrates the interdependence, 
for better or for worse, of states that are part of the globalised world; the decisive 
importance of technological evolution; and thus the need for fiscal justice to apply to 
those economic operators that are most advantaged by progress in order to provide 
states and international bodies (in particular, the EU) with the resources to inter-
vene in urgent cases to protect the most vulnerable parts of the population.
There are many difficulties involved in achieving such an arrangement. The 
greatest problem is that decision-making power remains in the hands of states, 
which are driven to take unilateral and therefore uncoordinated measures. The lat-
ter not only risk being ineffective but can also trigger conflicts of a wider scope, as 
demonstrated by the reaction of the United States to the introduction of a digital 
tax by the French Parliament. This rigidity should not weaken efforts, however. The 
doctrine must propose solutions that may not be realizable today on account of his-
torical and political contingencies. In this context (and in the context of the broad 
debate that has developed in recent years at a philosophical rather than a juridical 
level [Koche R., 2019: 41 ff.]), the re-evaluation of the solidaristic function of taxa-
tion beyond the borders of any individual legal system appears to be a fundamental 
key to interpreting the new phenomena [Koche R., 2019]. It would help to justify 
both the greater burden imposed on companies operating in high-tech sectors and 
the need for the results of this imposition to be shared in a supranational perspective.
12. Algorithms, computability and the future of law
As much as the other themes considered earlier, decisions are a key theme with 
which contemporary law must deal. We take decisions all the time, and we do so 
more and more often, relying on the support provided by new technologies at 
several different levels. In politics, the very role of parliament is being replaced 
by forms of digital democracy that completely overturn the modern concept of 
democracy. Obviously, many ethical questions are involved: new technologies are 
changing ethical problems, on the one hand, and we are beginning to see the prob-
lem of entrusting certain automatic decisions to machines, on the other. The world 
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economy is increasingly controlled by algorithms, and global stock exchanges are 
operating at the speed of light. There are digital platforms based on machine learn-
ing systems that can propose an ideal partner by examining affinities, desires, and 
many other parameters that we are not even able to control. Every time we buy a 
book or anything else online, profiling systems suggest other goods to buy. If you 
liked this one, then you might also like another. In short, we increasingly make 
decisions at the suggestion of machines. 
Are these decisions carefully considered, however? Clearly, the main problem 
for us here is that of the legally relevant decision. For a jurist, the decision par 
excellence is the court judgment. We increasingly speak about technologies ap-
plied to the work of judges and courts [Sartor G., Branting K., 1998: 216]. Digital 
evidence is a highly debated topic today, all the more so as a whole range of instru-
ments is applied to legal procedure. However, the problem that interests us here is 
more specific: the algorithmic decision [Barfield W., 2020].
The spectre of the robot-judge is haunting law today. An automatic judge is a 
nightmare for some. The prospect of machines working alongside humans gener-
ates the fear that the former may replace the latter [Pasquale F., 2020]. An auto-
matic judge is frightening, because judging must also involve listening. The judg-
ment is a place where general and abstract law comes to terms with the embodied 
reality of society. In judges, we also look for the humanity of this reality, which is 
always particular and concrete, while machines are seen as lacking all passions and 
emotions. However, even if this were true, our tradition also includes the ideal of 
an impassionate judge.
We firmly believe that algorithms are not good or bad, right or wrong: it is the 
application of algorithms that is good or bad, right or wrong. Law cannot pass by 
the opportunities that such an instrument offers, yet it should not suffer its adverse 
effects, either. Law must govern technology [Wischmeyer T., Rademacher  T., 
2020], striking a balance between synthetic and human, impartiality and emo-
tivity, the law of silicon and the law of flesh. Law must remain human, precisely 
because it is artificial in the sense indicated above.
Law is not only a set of public norms. The cognitive heritage of a legal system is 
not only formal, i.e., computable, but also heuristic, i.e., based on experience and 
practical observations.  The result is that law does not offer any mathematically 
calculable solutions. Law is not fully computable. 
It is obvious that law is undergoing a great evolution. One thousand years ago, 
custom was the quasi-exclusive source of law. Law was jurisprudential, i.e., made 
by experts. With the modern state, law has become (predominantly, if not exclu-
sively) an expression of the will of the legislator. Today, we are faced with something 
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totally different once again. It is unlikely that law will be entirely produced by ma-
chines in the near future. It is too early for dystopian visions. The most likely sce-
nario is that something hybrid will arise [Hildebrandt M., Gaakeer A., 2015].
Information technologies are inevitably presenting problems in every field of 
knowledge. We agree with those who say that our time will be remembered as a 
revolutionary era that upset previous social, economic, political, cultural and even 
mental models. Just as writing and printing before, digitization opens up hitherto 
unimaginable possibilities as well as posing problems that need to be addressed. 
The resulting social transformations are still in the making, of course. Neverthe-
less, this process has already led to disruptions that are visible to everyone. If legal 
science wants to maintain contact with society (and reality), it cannot disregard 
the new technologies. 
Knowing the methods and techniques of information technology is a prereq-
uisite for understanding the functioning of information society, including its legal 
aspects. This is a complicated task insofar as it requires jurists to tackle problems 
that go beyond traditional legal issues. It is also a challenge that compels jurists to 
engage on two fronts at once. 
On the one hand, the question of how information technology can contribute 
to solving the practical and theoretical problems of legal science remains open. 
On the other, there exists the problem of constantly renewing classical legal disci-
plines in the face of the remarkable changes that the ICT revolution is producing 
in society [Galloway K. et al, 2019: 27–45]. 
The jurist should face the new challenges of today without fear and without nos-
talgia. To this end, he must consent to the necessary dialogue between jurists of dif-
ferent backgrounds, between jurists and non-jurists, and between jurists and society. 
Let us therefore continue to teach about larceny while also helping students 
to understand how phishing is handled in criminal cases in our legal system. We 
must emphasize the unchanging value of the definition of usufruct in the Corpus 
juris civilis while also reflecting about the legal responsibilities of Internet service 
providers. We should not throw away the voluminous tomes of the Pandectæ, yet 
we should not keep them as a yoke on our shoulders, either. Let us climb upon 
them to look further into the distance.
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